This week, telecom security company Enea published research on SilentAir, a newly identified actor that compromised signaling equipment inside mobile operators in at least six Asian countries. From those footholds, it diverted calls and text messages of selected subscribers, with Taiwan as its main focus and targets in about a dozen other countries and territories, including in Europe and the Middle East. Enea assesses with high confidence that SilentAir is a state-level actor.
It is a story about telecom. It is also a story about identity.
How the attack works
Mobile networks constantly tell each other where a subscriber is. When your phone roams, the visited network sends an UpdateLocation message to your home network, over SS7 or its successor Diameter. The home network then routes your incoming calls and texts there.
SilentAir abused exactly that mechanism. From hijacked nodes inside real operators, it told a target’s home network that the phone was now being served by equipment it controlled. When the home network accepted, calls and SMS for that number flowed to the attacker.
Three details stand out:
- Interception was the point. According to Enea, 18.3% of SilentAir’s activity was interception, against roughly 2% for typical commercial surveillance firms. This was not bulk data gathering. It was targeted.
- Two-factor codes followed. For some targets, one-time login codes arrived right after the diversion, which suggests attempts to get into other accounts.
- Silent SMS at scale. Large volumes of invisible text messages, many sent around midnight, were likely used to check whether the diversions were still active.
The attacks came from inside trusted infrastructure: the IPX, the shared backbone mobile operators use to exchange signaling. For the receiving network, the malicious messages looked like normal operator traffic. Enea has warned the affected operators and says the activity is disrupted for now.
Encryption was not the weak point
Many organisations answer telecom risk with a single move: use an end-to-end encrypted app. That is necessary. It is not sufficient.
SilentAir did not need to break any encryption. It went after what sits underneath: the phone number. A number is a fixed, globally routable identifier. It is tied to a SIM, a device, an operator and, in practice, a person. Whoever can talk to the signaling network can ask where that number lives, redirect what is sent to it, and use it as a key to other accounts through SMS codes.
That is the static identity chain: fixed device, fixed number, fixed identifiers, predictable metadata. Every link is stable, so every link can be looked up, followed and exploited. Not by breaking cryptography, but by asking the network the right question from the right place.
Why this matters beyond Taiwan
It is tempting to read SilentAir as a regional story. It is not. The targeting reached Europe and the Middle East, and the technique relies on how mobile networks worldwide trust each other. Any official, officer or executive whose sensitive work depends on a SIM-based identity is exposed to the same class of attack, whichever actor is behind it.
For defence and government organisations, the practical questions are simple:
- Which of your people still receive login codes by SMS for systems that matter?
- Which sensitive conversations still depend on a phone number to reach someone?
- If a hostile actor could see and redirect that number, what would they learn?
Breaking the chain
At ARMA, we start from the assumption that the network around the user cannot be trusted. That is why we build around Dynamic Identity: instead of one persistent identity that follows the user everywhere, the link between person, device and identifiers is broken up, so there is no stable address for an adversary to look up, redirect or track over time. Our serverless architecture removes the central servers that could otherwise become the next point to compromise, and post-quantum encryption protects content against both current and future decryption.
No single technology removes every risk. But SilentAir shows where the real exposure sits. The cryptography held. The identity did not.
If you want to see what your organisation’s telecom exposure looks like in practice, we are happy to show you.



